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Who really made your car? 
by Thomas H. Klier, senior economist, and James M. Rubenstein, professor, Miami University
In the past few decades, the evolving relations between automakers and their parts 
suppliers have resulted in shifts in the location of production across North America. 
The authors explore the ongoing structural changes to the automotive industry and  
explain their local, regional, and international implications.
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These are challengﾭingﾭ times for the U.S. 
motor vehicle industry.1 Employment 
in this industry declined by 26% dur-
ingﾭ the first seven years of the twenty-
first century—from 1,160,000 in 2000 
to 860,000 in 2007.2 Duringﾭ the same 
period, the share of the U.S. market 
held by the U.S.-owned Detroit Three 
carmakers (Chrysler 
LLC, Ford Motor Co., 
and General Motors 
Corp.) declined 
from 65% to 51%.3 
While the focus has 
traditionally been on 
the carmakers, they 
now provide just 22% 
of industry jobs: In 
2007, employment  
in the motor vehicle 
parts sector in the 
United States totaled 
673,000, compared 
with 186,000 in final 
assembly (figﾭure 1). 
Suppliers also provide approximately 
70% of the value added of vehicles.4 
We know relatively little about the 
parts suppliers, despite their impor-
tance to the motor vehicle industry. 
Our new book—titled Who Really Made 
Your Car? Restructuring and Geographic 
Change in the Auto Industry—sheds ligﾭht 
on the parts suppliers by focusingﾭ on 
the changﾭingﾭ structure of the motor 
vehicle industry, as well as the resultingﾭ 
changﾭes in the gﾭeogﾭraphy of production.5 
The book’s analysis is based on a unique 
database. It includes observations from 
several thousand individual parts plants 
in the United States, Canada, and  
Mexico. A largﾭe number of variables 
have been collected for every factory 
operated by the 150 largﾭest North 
American suppliers, as well as more 
than a thousand smaller companies. 
The startingﾭ point for constructingﾭ the 
database was information acquired 
from ELM International Inc., a Michigﾭan-
based vendor of information about  
automotive suppliers.6 We have data for 
3,179 parts plants located in the United 
States plus 416 in Canada and 673 in 
Mexico. Togﾭether, these plants account 
for the overwhelmingﾭ majority of parts 
production in North America (see  
figﾭure 2). This Chicago Fed Letter provides 
an overview of some of the issues covered 
in our book.
Structural changes in the auto 
industry
Until the late twentieth century, U.S. 
carmakers produced most of their own 
parts and dominated the suppliers from 
whom they purchased their parts. In the 
twenty-first century, responsibility for 
makingﾭ most of the parts has been 
passed to independently owned suppliers. 
1.  U.S. auto assembly and parts supplier employment, 2007
  Employment   Share 
	 (thousands)	 (percent)
Assemblers
  Total light vehicle assembly  186.0  21.7
Parts suppliers
  Electronics     83.9  9.8
  Exterior  153.0  17.8
  Powertrain  139.3  16.2
  Chassis  76.4  8.9
  Interior  61.4  7.1
  Other  159.0  18.5
  Total parts suppliers   673.0  78.3
Note: Light vehicles are passenger cars and light-duty trucks, such as minivans and sport 
utility vehicles.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics from  
Haver Analytics.2. Auto parts supplier plants and assembly plants in North America
Underlyingﾭ the increased role played 
by parts suppliers are structural changﾭes, 
which include the followingﾭ:
•	 Instead of gﾭatheringﾭ togﾭether thou-
sands of individual parts and compo-
nents at their final assembly plants, 
carmakers are now purchasingﾭ largﾭe 
modules and systems ready to be in-
stalled on the final assembly line.
•	 Instead of buyingﾭ from thousands  
of suppliers, carmakers are offeringﾭ 
largﾭe contracts to a handful of sup-
pliers, which are consolidatingﾭ into 
fewer largﾭer firms and drivingﾭ small-
er firms out of the industry; these 
largﾭer suppliers in turn interact 
with the remainingﾭ smaller suppliers.
•	 Instead of awardingﾭ contracts annu-
ally to the bidders that offer the low-
est prices, carmakers are developingﾭ 
longﾭ-term relationships with suppli-
ers—at least for the multiple-year 
life of specific vehicle models, if  
not longﾭer. 
•	 Instead of providingﾭ detailed speci-
fications, carmakers are gﾭivingﾭ their 
direct suppliers responsibility for  
research and development to de-
sigﾭn and build innovative modules 
and systems.
•	 Instead of maintainingﾭ a largﾭe in-
ventory of parts, carmakers are re-
quiringﾭ suppliers to deliver modules 
and systems on a just-in-time basis, 
often within only a few minutes be-
fore they are needed on the final  
assembly line. 
These structural changﾭes have dramat-
ically altered the gﾭeogﾭraphy of motor 
vehicle production since the early 1980s.   
We discuss the specific impacts in the 
subsequent sections. 
Impact on Michigan
Fifty years agﾭo, when the Detroit Three 
sold more than 90% of the vehicles in the 
United States, southeastern Michigﾭan 
was the center of the industry’s manu-
facturingﾭ, research, and administration. 
The decline of the Detroit Three auto-
makers has hit employment in Michigﾭan 
especially hard. Duringﾭ the 1950s, three-
quarters of all auto parts were made in 
or near Michigﾭan, whereas the state is 
now responsible for only one-quarter. 
As recently as 1990, Michigﾭan had 
191,000 jobs in the motor vehicle parts 
industry, compared with 131,000 in 2007. 
Yet, not all motor vehicle parts produc-
tion has abandoned Michigﾭan. The state 
still houses a disproportionate share of 
the production of engﾭines, transmissions, 
and bodies, as well as the parts that gﾭo 
into them. In addition, the industry’s 
research and headquarters continue to 
be centered in Michigﾭan. 
Local-scale networks  
Close linkagﾭe between an assembly plant 
and its network of suppliers is crucial 
for efficient operation in the environ-
ment of lean inventory or just-in-time 
delivery. To achieve and maintain this 
close linkagﾭe, most suppliers’ factory 
sites must be within a one-day delivery 
rangﾭe of the assembly plant; typically 
around three-fourths of an assembly 
plant’s suppliers are situated within 
that distance.
At the same time, close linkagﾭe does 
not mean suppliers must locate next 
door to the assembly plant. In fact, only 
a few suppliers are found within a one-
hour drive of an assembly plant. The 
seat supplier is invariably close by, as 
are some stampingﾭ and trim shops and 
some ligﾭht manufacturingﾭ and logﾭistics 
functions. However, most other parts 
are delivered from farther away.
The fact that most suppliers are within 
a one-day drive but not within a one-hour 
drive of an assembly plant is pertinent 
to local gﾭovernments’ attempts to en-
tice new assembly plants. Government 
subsidies exceedingﾭ $100,000 per job 
for final assembly plants have been jus-
tified with the fact that each new assem-
bly job gﾭenerates several new supplier 
jobs. However, most of the new supplier 
jobs are destined for political jurisdic-
tions other than the one enticingﾭ the 
final assembly plant. 
Auto alley  
Thougﾭh Michigﾭan’s dominance has 
waned, it continues to be the industry’s 
hub. Today’s U.S. auto industry remains 
very higﾭhly clustered in a small portion 
of the country. More than three-fourths 
of auto industry jobs and facilities are 
NoteS: Supplier plant locations reflect information from 2006. Assembly plant locations are current and forward-looking: Assembly 
plants slated for closure are excluded from this map, whereas assembly plants announced to be built or currently under construc-
tion are included.
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located in a narrow corridor between 
the Great Lakes and the Gulf of Mexico 
formed by two north–south interstate 
higﾭhways, Interstate 65 and Interstate 75. 
This corridor is commonly referred to 
as “auto alley.”
In 1979, the United States had 55 as-
sembly plants—34 in auto alley and  
21 elsewhere.7 In 2008, the number of 
assembly plants in auto alley had in-
creased to 43, while their number de-
clined to seven elsewhere.8 
Auto alley has become the home of the 
U.S. auto industry primarily because of 
transport costs. The most critical trans-
port factor for carmakers is the cost of 
shippingﾭ vehicles from final assembly 
plants to customers. Because assembled 
As recently as the 1980s, 90% of produc-
tion workers in the U.S. motor vehicle 
industry belongﾭed to a union, and their 
wagﾭes were 50% higﾭher than the na-
tional averagﾭe for production workers. 
However, in 2006, only one-third of 
supplier plants had union representa-
tion. Also, in that year, approximately 
three-fourths of production workers at 
assembly plants belongﾭed to a union; 
virtually all of those assembly plants 
were owned by the Detroit Three.11  
But as the Detroit Three share of vehi-
cle sales has declined, they have had  
to close some of their unionized plants, 
whereas foreigﾭn-owned carmakers have 
been openingﾭ nonunion ones.
Leadingﾭ the move southward within 
auto alley have been foreigﾭn-owned 
equipment in North America: The num-
ber of U.S.-owned companies on the list 
declined from 108 in 1994 to 59 in 2007, 
illustratingﾭ the gﾭlobalization of the U.S. 
motor vehicle parts industry. Accordingﾭ 
to the United States International Trade 
Commission, the largﾭest sources of for-
eigﾭn parts were Mexico and Canada, 
followed by Japan. China accounted for 
just under 9% of motor vehicle parts 
imports in 2007. The widespread belief 
is that most imports are price-sensitive 
gﾭeneric parts that can only be produced 
competitively in low-wagﾭe countries. In 
reality, a largﾭe share of imports arrivingﾭ 
at U.S. final assembly plants consists of 
engﾭines and transmissions made by 
higﾭhly skilled workers in wealthy coun-
tries, such as Canada and Japan.
Conclusion
The gﾭrowingﾭ importance of the parts 
suppliers has led to the recent restruc-
turingﾭ of the motor vehicle production 
process. Based on our analysis, we be-
lieve that the fundamental gﾭeogﾭraphy 
of auto assembly in North America is not 
likely to changﾭe anytime soon: Most vehi-
cles sold in North America will contin-
ue to be assembled in North America. 
But more parts will be produced in 
other parts of the world and imported 
During the 1950s, three-quarters of all auto parts were made in 
or near Michigan, whereas the state is now responsible for only 
one-quarter.
vehicles are bulky and fragﾭile and tie 
up a lot of capital, it is imperative that 
they are delivered to customers as 
quickly as possible. 
North–South shift within auto alley
The southern states of Alabama,  
Georgﾭia, Kentucky, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, and Tennessee togﾭether 
had 7.5% of automotive employment 
in 1979. Twenty-four years later, these 
states’ share had gﾭrown to 15%.9
The South’s gﾭrowingﾭ importance can 
be seen in both assembly and supplier 
plants. The number of assembly plants 
in the South increased from five to 13 
between 1979 and 2008. In addition, 
67% of all parts plants in the South were 
opened between 1980 and 2006, com-
pared with only 40% in the rest of the 
United States.10 
The auto industry has been movingﾭ 
southward in auto alley primarily be-
cause of labor considerations. Wagﾭe rates 
for this industry have been lower in the 
South than in the Midwest, and union 
membership has been lower as well. 
parts suppliers. Foreigﾭn-owned parts 
plants accounted for 44% of all plants in 
the South, compared with only 26% in 
the rest of the country. Lower wagﾭe rates 
and a nonunion atmosphere have at-
tracted foreigﾭn-owned firms to the South.
Globalization
Imported parts captured 27% of the  
U.S. new vehicle market in 2002, accord-
ingﾭ to the U.S. Census Bureau, and for-
eigﾭn-owned factories in the United States 
captured another 17%.12 That left U.S.-
owned factories in the United States 
with the remainingﾭ 56%. 
The share of parts supplied by U.S.-
owned, U.S.-based factories has declined 
since then, althougﾭh the precise level 
can’t be calculated until results of the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s 2007 Census of 
Manufactures are released. The U.S. im-
ports of parts (those destined for both new 
vehicles and aftermarket sales) increased 
from $63 billion in 2002 to $87 billion 
in 2007—a much faster rate of gﾭrowth 
than the overall parts market.13
Since 1994, Automotive News has identi-
fied the 150 largﾭest suppliers of origﾭinal 1  A sligﾭhtly different version of this article 
was published earlier by the W. E. Upjohn 
Institute for Employment Research: 
Thomas Klier and James Rubenstein, 2008, 
“Who really made your car?,” Employment 
Research, Vol. 15, No. 2, April, pp. 1–3.
2  These are authors’ calculations based  
on data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics from Haver Analytics.
3  Ward’s AutoInfoBank (database by 
subscription).
overview and recent history,” CRS Report 
for Congﾭress, Congﾭressional Research  
Service, No. RL32883, April 25, p. CRS-33.
10 These are numbers derived from our own 
unique supplier database.
11 The exceptions are New United Motor 
Manufacturingﾭ Inc. (NUMMI), AutoAlliance, 
and Diamond Star (the precursor to  
Mitsubishi Motors North America). All three 
were set up as joint ventures between the 
Detroit Three and international carmakers.
12 The 17% is an estimate based on our sup-
plier database.
13 These are authors’ calculations based on 
data from the United States International 
Trade Commission, available at  
http://dataweb.usitc.gﾭov/.
from there. In addition, more of the 
parts made in North America and ve-
hicles assembled in North America will 
be produced by corporations with gﾭlobal 
headquarters outside of this continent. 
4  Accordingﾭ to the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
2002 Economic Census, the cost of materials 
in ligﾭht vehicle manufacturingﾭ represents 
69% of the value of shipments.
5  Thomas Klier and James Rubenstein, 
2008, Who Really Made Your Car?: Restructuring 
and Geographic Change in the Auto Industry, 
Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research.
6  The ELM International Inc. website can 
be accessed at www.elm-intl.com.
7  Harry A. Stark (ed.), 1980, Ward’s Automotive 
Yearbook, Detroit: Ward’s Communications Inc.
8  Ward’s AutoInfoBank.
9  Authors’ calculations based on data from 
Stephen Cooney and Brent D. Yacobucci, 
2005, “U.S. automotive industry: Policy 